Qur’an, Hadith, and Sunnah: Contemporary Discourses of fiqa on marriage

Despite the agreement of early Sunni jurists on point, ‘for a man to contract binding marriages for his minor daughter without her consent’, current conventional wisdom among Muslims in the West holds that women’s consent is always necessary for their marriages. A ubiquitous pamphlet entitled “Women’s Status in Islam” circulated by ICNA, one of the largest mainstream Muslim organizations in the US, states of any woman that “As a legal entity, her marriage is not possible without her consent.” An online question-and-answer column provides this response from “Imam” Sa‘dullah Khan to a question about women’s choice of marriage partners: “Neither the guardian nor anyone else can coerce a female to marry against her wishes, since Islam emphatically disallows forced marriages.”[1]  In these instances, as with other examples too numerous to cite, the Prophet’s statement about the virgin needing to be consulted and the non-virgin having more right to herself than her marriage guardian is given as proof that compulsory marriage is not permissible.

 

For these and other contemporary authors, then, the Prophet’s words settle the question. The modern authors who affirm women’s freedom from compulsion to marry are not articulating a critique of dominant jurisprudential doctrine based on a reinterpretation of this hadith; rather, they present the necessity of female consent as if it were an uncontested description of a traditional position. And unlike in the fiqh literature, the Prophet’s marriage to ‛Ā’ishah is almost never discussed, even to suggest that it was exceptional to him or is no longer appropriate as an example for Muslim men to follow.[2]  This stress on the Prophet’s statement is illustrative of a larger phenomenon in contemporary discussions of Islamic marriage: the Prophet’s own actions are rarely mentioned, while a few ahādīth, such as the one declaring that a virgin’s permission must be sought, are repeated frequently.

 

Indeed, for many Muslims today Prophetic sunna is essentially synonymous with hadith.[3]  This identification is troubling for those who value the methods and diligent approach of jurisprudence, because ahādīth reports, in and of themselves, are not a source of law. The sunnah of God’s Messenger is considered by jurists to constitute the second source of law, after the Qur’an. The hadith literature is merely a means of recording and transmitting that sunnah. Thus, to the extent that particular ahādīth help us to know the Prophet’s sunnah, they are useful for legal purposes. But they are materials to be interpreted as part of a larger process, not legal directives that can be directly applied.

 

Others have questioned the importance of ahādīth on a different basis: they are only acceptable as the source for discovering the Prophet’s sunnah to the extent that their authenticity is accepted. With regard to the reports on both women and marriage, there is reason to suspect the authenticity of some of the most frequently cited ahādīth.

 

The issue of authenticity can be addressed succinctly, though of course it cannot be resolved here. With due respect to the immense accomplishments of al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and other hadith scholars, legitimate critiques have been raised about both chains of transmission (isnād) and content (matn) for several oft-repeated misogynist ahādīth.  As to the former, the problematic role of Abū Hurayrah as a transmitter of numerous Prophetic statements derogatory toward women has not yet been satisfactorily dealt with.[4] As for the latter, it has been argued that these statements stressing female deficiency and the magnitude of husbands’ rights over their wives are sufficiently incompatible with the Qur’anic view of women and marriage so as to require, in Khaled Abou El Fadl’s terms, a “conscientious pause” before one relies on them in making legal determinations.

 

Yet it is precisely these traditions that many ultra-conservative, Salafī, or Wahhābī jurists and activists rely on in their discourses about marriage and spousal rights.  In the collection of Saudi juridical responsa studied by Abou El Fadl, one frequently finds statements attributed to the Prophet that affirm women’s moral and intellectual weakness, delicate constitutions, and inherent susceptibility to temptation. Alongside these generally “demeaning” hadith, numerous others specify the need for female obedience in marriage, particularly with regard to submitting to the husband’s sexual desires.

 

It is largely because of the prominence of statements such as these in contemporary appeals to hadith that most feminist Muslims have made sparing reference to the hadith literature in their attempts to rethink Muslim marriage, relying instead on internal textual criteria to interpret the Qur’an.  Asma Barlas has argued that

 

[I]nequality and discrimination derive not from the teachings of the Qur’an but from the secondary religious texts, the Tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis) and the Ahādīth (s. hadith) (narratives purportedly detailing the life and praxis of the Prophet Muhammad).[5]

 

A number of prominent feminist exegetes such as Amina Wadud have argued that the difficulties with the hadith literature are so significant that only the Qur’an is reliable as a source for God’s commands.[6] Barlas does not go quite this far, arguing that sunnah is supplementary to the Qur’an, though it must be ultimately subordinate to it, and that ahādīth are potentially useful as a way of knowing the sunnah.

 

When authors such as Barlas do discuss the personal conduct of the Prophet Muhammad, they tend to emphasize the “egalitarian aspects of the Prophet’s Sunnah.”[7]  Along with some apologists, they make brief reference to one or more of the following “facts” about the Prophet’s marital life: he did not confine his wives to their quarters; he was not harsh with them; he did not hit or abuse them; he did household chores; he dissuaded his son-in-law from taking a second wife; and he divorced a woman who expressed an unwillingness to be married to him.[8]

 

Some have, quite reasonably, leveled charges of inconsistency against those who unquestioningly accept these positive reports about the Prophet’s conduct while critiquing the reliability of Prophetic statements drawn from the same, or similar, source materials. Yet since traditional legal, exegetical, and historical sources are quite clear that Muhammad was gentle and kind with his wives, not harsh, that he helped with household chores, and so forth, why not make this the starting point for a more thorough engagement with his sunnah?

 

Most of the contemporary disagreement over the relative weight of Qur’an, hadith, and sunnah as authoritative sources for regulating Muslim conduct relates to the authenticity of certain Prophetic sayings applicable to women: those that liken them to donkeys and dogs, or describe them as “crooked” (from a bent rib), “a trial” (for male Muslims), or as the majority of the inhabitants of Hell.  Those that “command” obedience of a wife to her husband, and suggest that women’s entry into paradise is dependent on their husband’s pleasure are repugnant to many contemporary Muslims, while they are vigorously defended by others as a realistic and appropriate basis for the distribution of rights in family and society.

 

It seems safe to assume that there is never going to be agreement between all sections of the Muslim community as to how to deal with these ahādīth. Some will always hold that they are sound (saḥīḥ) and others that they cannot possibly be so.  In reality, however, they are marginal to the Prophet’s sunnah. This is particularly the case when we emphasize that portion of the sunna that relates to his own conduct in his personal relationships. Despite the disagreement about the ahādīth just discussed, there is significant, unremarked common ground among Muslims from widely divergent perspectives as to what the Prophet himself actually did in his relationships with his wives.[9]

 

A renewed focus on the Prophet’s own behavior can provide a bridge between the alternatives of a sole focus on Qur’an, which by itself is not sufficient as a guide to Muslim practice, and the acceptance of problematic and troubling ahādīth. What might be the implications if this type of epistemological precedence were granted to the Prophet’s own behavior? It would become possible to argue that the Prophet’s model provides important guidance to Muslim husbands about how to behave and to Muslim women about the type of behavior they have a right to expect in their marriages. However, this type of discussion must move beyond the superficial invocation of Muhammad’s gentleness with his wives to a serious consideration of those of his actions that cause consternation, embarrassment, or discomfort today among Muslims: among them, his multiple wives and his marriage to a pre-pubescent girl.[10]

 

As my discussion of the early jurists demonstrates, simply knowing the Prophet’s sunnah is neither a panacea for disagreement nor a fixed prescription for legal doctrine. Though they largely agreed on what the Prophet himself did under particular circumstances, the fuqahā’ did not arrive at the same answers as to whether his behavior obligated, encouraged, or even permitted other Muslims to behave in the same way. My extended exploration of several legal issues discussed with respect to the Prophet’s marriages was meant to illustrate the complex variables involved in those legal determinations, in contrast to the oversimplified ways in which Muslim marriage, and the Prophet’s marital conduct, is too often discussed today. The example of the early jurists demonstrates that ikhtilāf – disagreement – was the rule, not the exception, on numerous issues, yet nonetheless, they were able to engage in serious dialogue because of the common commitment to discovering ways to live out the Prophetic example. We must strive today to do the same.

---

[1] “The Right to Choose,” Ask the Imam (Sa‘dullah Khan), from www.beliefnet.com, printed 1/30/03. “The consent of both the man and the woman is an essential element of marriage,” according to Raga’ El-Nimr, “Women in Islamic Law,” in Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives, ed. Mai Yamani (New York: NYU, 1996), 96.

[2] For one exception, see Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 125.  She suggests, briefly, that this marriage might fall within the category of “specific types of marriages” that the Prophet alone was permitted to contract by Q. 33:50.

[3] For one approach to this topic, see Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic Research, 1965).

[4] Abou El Fadl notes that “[M]any of the traditions demeaning to women are reported, in one version or another, by Abū Hurayrah who has been a rather controversial figure in early Islamic history.  In fact criticism directed at his credibility is not novel, and, in fact, has induced some writers to compose books in his defense.” See Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 215, and the sources cited there. For an extended discussion of one tradition related by Abū Hurayrah, and the question of his reliability, see Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading (MA): Addison –Wesley Publishing Company, 1991), 62-81. See also Barlas, Believing Women in Islam, 49. 

[5] Barlas, Believing Women, 3.

[6] Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bhakti Snd., 1992).

[7] Barlas, Believing Women, 125.

[8] Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, 214-5; Barlas, Believing Women, 124-5; Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, 142-5, 156-7; Najla Hamadeh, “Islamic Family Legislation: The Authoritarian Discourse of Silence,” in Yamani, ed., Feminism and Islam, 335, 342, 348-9 (n. 28). 

[9] Here, I would like to borrow the distinction so usefully made by Ali Asani and Kamal Abdel-Malik between “the Muhammad of faith” and “the historical Muhammad.” Celebrating Muhammad: Images of the Prophet in Popular Muslim Poetry (Columbia (SC): University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 5. For my purposes, so long as Muslims agree as to the validity of these narratives, whether they are historically true or not is beside the point.

[10] Barlas notes these competing precedents. Believing Women, 124.

MODERN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE QUR’AN : Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari

Another important chapter is on Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari from post-revolutionary Iran contributed by Farzin Vahdat.  According to him, the "Post-revolutionary Islamic thought in Iran is characterised by a hermeneutic approach. However, the hermeneutics involved in this thought is of a different nature from that of its predecessors, that is, the Islamic revolutionary discourses of the 1960s and 1970s.

 

According to Shabestari faith is [not?] blind imitation. It is a serious act of choice and commitment. Those who blindly imitate cannot be serious about their faith. It is, at best, a mechanical act without passionate commitment. Freedom of choice and freedom of conscience is an important part of living faith. Thus Shabestari writes:

"Faith is an act of choosing, a fateful act. The question is when a human being is facing a dilemma and chooses the type of life style he wants to live by, what path should he take? The ideal society for faith [to flourish] and the faithful is one in which [conditions for making] this choice is most widely available. The truth of faith is a free act of conscious choice. All our mystics ('rafa') have urged the forsaking of imitated faith and adoption of conscious faith."

For Shabestari freedom of thought is absolutely necessary for faith.  For the Mu'tazalites, responsible action is important and this depends on innate human reasoning and this implies freedom of thought. The philosophers emphasise ma’rifah (knowledge) and this isn't possible without going beyond dogmas and liberating thought from it through freedom of thought. Whichever way one looks at it, freedom is necessary and faith (iman) thus has a direct relation with freedom of thought. Faith and responsible action (iman and 'amal salih) are not possible without freedom of thought. 

 

Shabestari also talks of the 'discontent of modernity' and goes on to elaborate it. The centuries before modern centuries were centuries of 'certitude'. People believed in certain dogmas and were certain of them. They never felt it necessary to evaluate them or have a critical attitude towards them. The modern person, on the other hand, lacks such certitude as he/she does not believe in such dogmas. In fact, they have critical evaluation of their beliefs again and again. Thus they suffer from an attitude of uncertainty and lack of permanence, and Shabestari feels modern theologians have to address this problem. While freedom of thought is important, lack of feeling of permanence has also to be addressed.

MODERN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE QUR’AN : Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd

The sixth chapter of the book is on the noted Egypt scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd who had to flee Egypt as his views on the Quranic text were not acceptable to the Islamic orthodoxy. This chapter has been contributed by Navid Kermani.  Navid says "In Abu Zayd's view, the outstanding civilising role of the Qur'an makes Arab culture 'a culture of the text' (hadarat alnass). Indeed, he goes so far as to describe it as the culture of the text par excellence.

 

According to Nasr, Arab culture was spawned by 'man's confrontation (jadal) with reality, and his dialogue (hiwar) with the text. Nasr also maintains significantly that to define Arab-Islamic civilisation as a culture of the text implies that it is also a culture of interpretation (hadrat al-ta'wil). Nasr, like other Muslim intellectuals we are discussing here, also maintains that the language of the Qur'an—like any other text—is not self explanatory and its meaning depends on the intellectual and cultural horizon of the reader (intaj dalalatihi). Hence the message of the text can only be revealed by its interpreters.

 

There have been different interpretations of the Quran and the main sects of Islam are also based on these differing interpretations. If there could be so many interpretations in early Islam, how can one avoid newer interpretations today as socio-cultural and political conditions have changed drastically ever since? Abu Zayd goes even further and makes an interesting point:

The [Qur'anic] text changed from the very first moment—that is, when the Prophet recited it at the moment of its revelation—from its existence as a divine text (nass ilahi), and became something understandable, a human text (nass insani), because it changed from revelation to interpretation (l-annahu tahawwala min al-tanzil ila a-ta'wil).

 

The Prophet's understanding of the text is one of the first phases of movement resulting from the text's connection with the human intellect.

 

Thus Abu Zayd lays great emphasis on understanding or interpretation of the text. Even personal background very much influences this understanding. If the same text is read before a group of people of the same spatio-temporal background it is likely to be understood in different ways by the individual members of the group if their intellectual development differs. Its transformation from divine revelation to human understanding plays a vital role in acting according to the text.

 

Abu Zayd makes another point about Prophet's understanding of the Qur'anic text. According to him, we cannot absolutise the Prophet's understanding of the text. "Such a claim [that the Prophet's understanding is sacred] leads to a kind of polytheism, because it equates the Absolute with the relative and the constant with the transient; and more specifically, because it equates the Divine Intent with the human understanding of this Intent, even in the case of the Messenger's understanding. It is a claim that leads to an idolization of a conferral of sainthood upon the Prophet, by concealing the Truth that he was a human, and by failing to present clearly enough the fact that he was merely a prophet."

 

Of course this is too radical a position to be accepted by the Muslims in general. The hadith literature plays very important role in tafsir or interpretation of the Qur'an in the Islamic world. The Prophet's understanding of the Qur'anic text is indeed considered sacred and absolute by the Muslims. More important is to challenge the understanding of the text by the Prophet's companions. But irony is that even the understanding of the Qur'an by the Prophet's companions is considered almost as absolute as that of the Prophet's. The Prophet's companions had radically different backgrounds from plain and illiterate Bedouins to those who had a highly developed and sophisticated intellectual background.

 

Also, one must make distinction between 'ibadat and mu’amalat in tafsir of the Qur'an. 'Ibadat should be left untouched and they can be treated as constant while the Qur'anic verses dealing with interpersonal issues (mu’amalat) could be subjected to different interpretations. Issues pertaining to women's rights have assumed much greater importance today and the Qur'anic injunctions in this and other respects of this nature could be opened to re-reading and re-interpretation. 

 

Even this is a difficult struggle but worth waging for realising the universal potential of Islam.  The Muslims today almost 'worship' not only the companions of the prophet but also companions of the companions (tab'a tabi'in and tab'a tab'a tabiin) and their understanding of the Qur'an is absolutised. The Muslims have to come out of that at least in matters of mu’amalat. If that happens, it will be a great achievement for the Islamic world.

MODERN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE QUR’AN : Amina Wadud

Asma Barlas has contributed a chapter on Amina Wadud's hermeneutics from women's perspective. Her chapter is aptly titled "Amina Wadud's hermeneutics of the Qur'an: women reading sacred texts." Needless to say the Islamic world is far from emerging from patriarchal values and the traditional 'ulama are immersed neck-deep into these values. Any deviation from them is denounced as unpardonable heresy. Unfortunately there have been very few attempts to commit this 'heresy'. The Islamic world has hardly produced women reading the holy text from their own viewpoint.

 

Amina Wadud is one among those women who are struggling to assert women's reading of the only text. She is not from any Muslim country but from USA. She is an African American Muslim though she has taught at the Islamic University of Malaysia for few years. But controversies dogged her there too. A definite methodology is needed to read the Qur'an from women's perspective. And Amina Wadud does develop her own methodology of reading and understanding the Qur'an.

 

Barlas points out that "Wadud believes that reading the Qur'an piecemeal and in a decontextualised way not only ignores its internal coherence, or nazm, but it also fails to recover the broad principles that underlie its teachings, as Fazlur Rahman also argues. As a result, most exegetes end up generalising specific Quranic injunctions, a practice Wadud believes is particularly oppressive to women in that some of the most harmful restrictions against them result 'from interpreting Qur'anic solutions for particular problems as if they were universal problems'". She gives the example of how traditional exegetes have interpreted the Qur'anic provisions on dressing.

 

Amina Wadud clarifies, "...the Qur'an establishes a universal notion regarding matters of dress and asserts that 'the dress of piety is best'. However, Shari'ah (Islamic law) uses the Qur'anic references to particular 7th century Arabian styles of dress as the basis of its legal conclusion regarding modesty. Consequently wearing a particular item of dress (for example, the head covering) is deemed an appropriate demonstration of modesty."

 

Wadud thus points out that universalising the veil, thus also universalises the 'culturally and economically determined demonstrations of modesty' in seventh century Arab society, thereby imparting a cultural specificity to the Qur'an's teachings. To her, this actually limits the application of these teachings inasmuch as cultures do not necessarily have identical ideas about modesty. Wadud thus argues that what the Qur'an teaches is the 'principle of modesty, not the veiling and seclusion which were manifestations particular to [the Arab] context.

 

However, in the Islamic world today veiling in the Arab way is considered a the universal principle of Islam and most of the non-Arab Muslim countries feel it obligatory to imitate this veiling and consider this kind of veils as the only way to protect one's modesty. What is more, it has also become for women the visible symbol of Islamic identity, especially in the alien western culture. Amina rightly thinks that it is a challenge for every new generation of Muslims 'to understand the principles intended by the particulars [since the] principles are eternal and can be applied in various social contexts.'

 

One also has to understand that the Qur'an was revealed in history and in particular social, cultural and historical conditions and it was a response to these circumstances in addition to being a universal guide for entire humanity. Thus one will have to separate the particular from the universal and, as pointed out by Amina Wadud and also by several other Islamic thinkers, every new generation has to discharge this responsibility in a creative way. 

 

As Amina says, 'it is God's response through Muhammad's mind this latter factor has been radically underplayed by the Islamic orthodoxy to a historical situation (a factor likewise drastically restricted by the Islamic orthodoxy in a real understanding of the Qur'an).' 

 

Amina also feels that 'gendered language' is used for God. God is referred to as 'He', a masculine gender though language cannot express 'what cannot be uttered in language and even though the Qur'an expressly forbids using similitudes for God. So she says the Muslims should realise that language about God 'cannot be interpreted empirically and literally.' Of course all along for centuries masculine gender has been used for God in all major world religions. Now some feminists are raising this question whether one can use masculine gender or gendered language at all for God. Some feminists even use 'She' for God. But Amina wants to go beyond gendered language for God. To transcend gendered language in case of God is an important point.

 

Wadud comes out with another novel argument for equality of sexes. She maintains that the purpose of "human creation was revealed when God said, 'Verily, I am going to create a khalifah (caretaker, vice-regent, or trustee) on the earth' [Q. 2:38] Khilafah (trusteeship) on the planet is the responsibility of each human. In the Qur'anic worldview, fulfillment of this trust constitutes the raison d'être of human existence. [Hence, to] deny full personhood to women is to deny them the full capacity of their fulfilling the basic responsibility decreed by God for all of humankind."

 

Thus Amina reads the Qur'an so as to develop arguments in favour of women and their equality with men. It is only a woman reading the Qur'an who can advance such arguments because she reads it from her perspective and for centuries so far it is men who have read and commented on the Qur'anic text. Thus it is necessary that the Qur'an be read from different perspectives so as to understand its full import for different sections of society.

MODERN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE QUR’AN : Fazlur Rahman

The very first chapter in the book is on Prof. Fazlur Rahman of Pakistan who was forced to migrate from Pakistan because of his views about Qur'an and Qur'anic revelation. Fazlur Rahman was himself son of an 'alim, had studied in the USA and was brought to Pakistan at the instance of the then President of Pakistan Ayub Khan. But he was forced to leave Pakistan on account of opposition from the traditional 'ulama.

 

The chapter on Rahman has been contributed by Abdullah Saeed. "Rahman", according to Saeed, "saw that the primary reason for the decline of Muslim societies was rooted in the intellectual legacy of Islam." But this decline, as often claimed by many modern reformers, did not begin with the western encroachment on Muslim societies from eighteenth century onwards. According to Saeed, "For him it was the intellectual ossification and replacement of scholarship based on original thought by one based on commentaries and super-commentaries, the closing of the gate of ijtihad, and basing of Islamic method solely on taqlid (blind imitation) which led to the decline."

 

Thus Fazlur Rahman writes in his book Islam and Modernity, "A historical critique of theological developments in Islam is the first step toward a reconstruction of Islamic theology. This critique should reveal the extent of the dislocation between the world view of the Qur'an and various schools of theological speculation in Islam and point the way toward a new theology."  This is a very important suggestion, which should have been considered very seriously and it would have benefited the Islamic world immensely.

 

The Mu'tazila theology had made a significant contribution in this direction in early Islamic history but it is sad though natural that their theology did not survive in view of orthodoxy. Many later modern Islamic thinkers were influenced by their theology. Muhammad Abduh of Egypt or Sir Syed Ahmad of India did accept rational elements of Mu'tazila theology. Sir Syed's tafsir in particular clearly shows influence of Mu'tazila theology and that is why the orthodox 'ulama of his times vehemently opposed him and forced him to stop writing commentary on the Qur'an.

 

Fazlur Rahman too was influenced by Mu'tazila as Abdullah Saeed also points out. He says, "Raman also had firm affinities with the Mu'tazili ideas on the 'createdness' of the Qur'an. This did not prevent Rahman, however, from being critical of the Mu'tazila's more extreme rationalist positions." No original thinker in fact fully endorses all positions of their predecessors though they may accept elements of their thinking or certain general ideas.

 

One cannot but agree with Saeed that "His (Fazlur Rahman's) goal was to reassess the Islamic intellectual tradition and provide a way forward for Muslims.  In his view, a re-examination of Islamic methodology in the light of the Qur'an itself was a pre-requisite for any reform in Islamic thought."  Also Fazlur Rahman greatly stressed the ethical aspect of the Qur'an. The traditional theology concerned itself more with ritualistic aspects than ethical, though did not entirely neglect it.

 

Prof. Rahman says: "Muslim scholars have never attempted an ethics of the Qur'an, systematically or otherwise. Yet no one who has done any careful study of the Qur'an can fail to be impressed by its ethical fervour. Its ethics, indeed, is its essence, and is also the necessary link between theology and law. It is true that the Qur'an tends to concretise the ethical, to cloth the general in a particular paradigm, and to translate the ethical into legal or quasi-legal commands. But it is precisely the sign of its moral fervor that is not content only with generalizable ethical propositions but is keen on translating them into actual paradigms. However, the Qur'an always explicates the objectives or principles that are the essence of its laws."

 

Thus Rahman's is a very seminal contribution in developing Islamic thought in the modern era and developing it in a rational and systematic way. The Islamic world, however, is still not ready to respond to Prof. Rahman's ideas.

MODERN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE QUR’AN

There have been differences between the 'ulama and the modern Islamic scholars and intellectuals in interpreting and understanding the Qur'an. Often these differences tend to be basic and hence modern intellectuals and Islamic scholars are persecuted in some Islamic countries. In these countries to differ from 'official 'ulama' means to be heretic and to be punished. This intolerance is more human than Islamic. The 'ulama fear that if what the modern intellectuals say is accepted than their dogmas may not be accepted and their line of thinking will stand isolated. In fact it is only a fear. The general intellectual level in most of the Islamic countries is not high enough to render the traditional ulama irrelevant.

 

It is quite interesting to note that despite such differences and persecution one finds modern intellectuals and Islamic scholars in Muslim countries who challenge the traditional thinking and even invite persecution for themselves. Recently Dr. Suha Taji-Arouki has edited an interesting book on this subject. She has included articles by various authors on such modern intellectuals from various countries from Indonesia to Algeria. This has been published by Oxford University Press, London, on behalf of the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London. The book makes very interesting reading and articles on noted intellectuals and scholars who have written on the Qur'an have been discussed in the book.

 

The book has chapters on Prof. Fazlur Rahman of Pakistan, Amina Wadud an African American Muslim, Egypt scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari from post-revolutionary Iran, Mohammad Arkoun, Nurcholis Majid, Mohammad Talbi, Huseyin Atay and Sadiq Nayhum.

 

This book also refutes the view that some western scholars take that there is homogeneity of thinking on theological issues in Islamic world. It is far from so. There are contending ideas and the orthodox approach is under challenge though orthodoxy may prevail. But that is a different story.   

 

Thus the book discusses many modern intellectuals from different countries and their approach to the Qur'an. For lack of space it is not possible to discuss all of them here in this paper, so only a few chapters are discussed in series hereafter. 

In Search of Islamic Justice Beyond 9/11

There is nothing in this clash of fundamentalisms that is intrinsically Islamic, in the same way that there is nothing intrinsically Christian about the religion of the Market or of the ideology of apartheid. That the Muslims responsible for the so called terrorist attacks may have been inspired by Islam is plausible; that they used Islam as justification for their deeds is apparent for the Qur'an is as open to diverse readings as any other text. There is thus some responsibility on the part of Muslim thinkers to expose and oppose the theological and textual basis of their arguments. To confine oneself to combat with those tendencies, however, is inadequate from both a South perspective as well as an Islamic one. To do so also risks being co-opted in an uncritical peace discourse that has a name: Pax Americana; peace on the terms of the United States and with an ideology incompatible with social, economic, political and environmental justice.

A progressive commitment to destabilizing the current world order – and destabilization is not to be conflated with political violence as numerous activists in the global justice movement are increasingly demonstrating - is not an option because of a blind hatred. Rather, unlike the Market fundamentalists, Muslims should actually believe that an alternative vision of the world and being in it is possible. Humankind, are not only consumers or the objects of greed; we are in a state of returning to God. Islam is, indeed, a religion of peace, but not exclusively that. It also calls upon people to destabilize the peace when it hides the demons of injustice. In addition to confronting the fundamentalism of the Market and the havoc that it has played with we also have to deal with the problem of Muslim brokenness, fragile egos and delusions of grandeur involving our power and control over a world governed by the shari‘ah. The problem with Muslim fundamentalism is that is as totalitarian and exclusive as the order that it seeks to displace. It seeks to create an order wherein they are the sole spokespersons for a rather vengeful, patriarchal and chauvinistic God – a God that incidentally resembles that of George W. Bush and his fellow travelers in the religious right wing. 

The Taliban represent the logical consequence of a literalist and misogynistic reading of our earlier Islamic heritage; a reading that is far from an aberration. They have, for example, always insisted that women will also have access to medical treatment if the government can afford it. How different is this from the Wahhabi regime in Saudi regime where they do enforce this segregation because they have the financial resources to do so. When we see Osama sitting cross-legged surrounded by hundred of books on Islamic jurisprudence and theology, we are seeing one of the strands in the Islamic. Arguing that the Taliban and the Wahhabis do not “really” represent Islam is unhelpful for we fall into the trap of setting ourselves up as the sole authentic spokespersons—the same weapon that is being used against many Muslims who stands out to talk against attrocities commited in name of Islam. We can insist on asking, along with `Ali Shari‘ati,: “Whose Islam? Whose lives and interest are being advanced by our understanding and interpretation of Islam?”

Which Islam is that the Shah refers to? Is it the Islam of imperialism? An Islam which is made for the next world and says nothing about this world. The imperialist brand of Islam dictates that Islamic nations be their colonies and allows then to loot the wealth, resources and productivity of Muslim lands.

People concerned about other people and aware that the earth is our only home with finite resources need to find each other and collectively work for socio-economic alternatives before these fanatics led by Corporate America under the flag of the McDonalds’ Golden Arches and Bush as its spokesperson or Al-Qaeda under the crescent with Osama bin Ladin as its spokesperson - destroy all of us.

THE SATAN’S ADVISORY COUNCIL

An old game of needs this mean world’s tact,
To heavenly host hopes a cold blood act.

That Great Maker bent to wreck earth soon,
Who gave it a name of ‘KAF’ and ‘NOON’.

To Europe I gave the kingship’s dream,
I broke the spell of church and mosque’s team.

I taught to the poor a lesson of fate,
To the wealthy I gave the wealth’s craze great.

Who can put out that fire’s big blaze,
Of riots whome Satan had set ablaze.

SATAN to Advisors

Thus lies in my hold the world’s pomp an show,
This earth, the Sun and Moon, the Sky’s glow.

Shall see the East and West my game and roar.
As soon I warm up Western nation’s gore.¹

The pontiffs of church, the leaders of State,
My one din’s echoe for them a dread great.

To her a modern world if a fool espies;
This culture’s wine cups will someone break and sea?

The collars to whom the Nature has torn,
The logic of Muzdak² to them cant darn.

How can frighten me the Socialist lads,³
Since long jobless, confused and loafing lads.³

From that nation but I feel a threat grave,
whose heart yet holds hidden embers of crave.

A few of them I espy in this nation yet,
At dawn who take ‘Wuzu’⁴ with tear drops jet.

He knows on whom hidden Times are bright,
The Islam, not Muzdak is the future’s fright.

I know this nation to Quran holds not,
The old craze for wealth is the Momin ‘s thought.

In dark nights of East this point I behold,
The sleeves of Harem Sheikhs no white hand hold.

I am but afraid that modern age needs,
May not force this age to know Prophet’s creed.

Beware! hundred times from the Prophet’s Act,
It guards women honour, makes man perfect.

A death knell to those who made the mar, slave,
It ruled out kingship, no beggary it gave.’


It cleaned the man’s wealth from’ every stain,
It made the rich trustees of wealth’s wrong drain.

No bigger change could be of deeds and thoughts,
This earth owns to Allah, to a king not.

His Law be kept hidden from whole world’s eye,
To my solace Moumin lacks a faith high.

Let him be fastened in metaphysics lone,
In his own meanings of the Koran’s tone.

Whose call God is Great⁵ broke the world spell,
That conscious man’s night why not a bright deli.

Did the Christ died or alive from start⁶?
Are God’s attributes His Part or apart?

Is the coming Christ Hindi Nasir’s dad?
Is he a mujaddid⁷ like the Mary’s lad?

Are God’s words mortal or old like Him hence?
Which sect of the Ummah will have riddance?

Are’nt now enough for Muslims of this age?
His dogmas gods he found in his rummage.⁸

From a practical life keep him away,
Get all his pawns beaten in this nice way.

He’s better a slave upto the dooms day,
Leave the mortal world for others hey-day.

The verse and mysticism suits for his ‘deen’.⁹
Which hides from his eyes life’s vital scene.

I fear from this Ummah lest they awake,
Being his faith’s base, world account he would take.

In prays at dawn keep him rapt¹⁰ and grave.¹¹
Make him zealot¹² fan of tombs and graves.

To plants we watered, caused to be trees,
Who can bring that old tree to knees.

On Christian Men marrying Muslim Women

All jurists agreed that a Muslim man or woman may not marry a mushrik [one who associates partners with God--there is a complex and multi-layered discourse on who is to be considered a mushrik, but we will leave this for a separate discussion]. However, because of al-Ma'ida verse 5, there is an exception in the case of a Muslim man marrying a kitabiyya. There is no express prohibition in the Qur'an or elsewhere about a Muslim woman marrying a kitabi. However, the jurists argued that since express permission was given to men, by implication women must be prohibited from doing the same. The argument goes: If men needed to be given express permission to marry a kitabiyya, women needed to be given express permission as well, but since they were not given any such permission then they must be barred from marrying a kitabi.

The justification for this rule was two-fold: 1) Technically, children are given the religion of their father, and so legally speaking, the offspring of a union between a Muslim male and a kitabiyya would still be Muslim; 2)It was argued that Muslim men are Islamically prohibited from forcing their wives to become Muslim. Religious coercion is prohibited in Islam. However, in Christianity and Judaism a similar prohibition against coercion does not exist. According to their own religious law, Muslim jurists argued, Christian men may force their Muslim wives to convert to their (the husbands') religion. Put differently, it was argued, Islam recognizes Christianity and Judaism as valid religions, but Judaism and Christianity do not recognize the validity of Islam as a religion. Since it was assumed that the man is the stronger party in a marriage, it was argued that Christian and Jewish men will be able to compel their Muslim wives to abandon Islam. (If a Muslim man would do the same, he would be violating Islamic law and committing a grave sin).

Importantly, the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi'i jurists held that it is reprehensible (makruh) for Muslim men to marry a kitabiyya if they live in non-Muslim countries. They argued that in non-Muslim countries, mothers will be able to influence the children the most. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that the children will not grow up to be good Muslims unless both parents are Muslim. Some jurists even went as far as saying that Muslim men are prohibited from marrying a kitabiyya if they live in non-Muslim countries.

This is the law as it exists or the legal legacy as we inherited it. In all honesty, personally, I am not convinced that the evidence prohibiting Muslim women from marrying a kitabi is very strong. Muslim jurists took a very strong position on this matter--many of them going as far as saying if a Muslim woman marries a kitabi she is as good as an apostate. I think, and God knows best, that this position is not reasonable and the evidence supporting it is not very strong. However, I must confess that in my humble opinion, I strongly sympathize with the jurists that argued that in non-Muslim countries it is reprehensible (makruh) for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim. God knows best--I have reached this position after observing that the children of these Muslim/non-Muslim marriages in most cases do not grow up with a strong sense of their Islamic identity. It seems to me that in countries like the U.S. it is best for the children if they grow up with a Muslim father and mother. I am not comfortable telling a Muslim woman marrying a kitabi that she is committing a grave sin and that she must terminate her marriage immediately. I do tell such a woman that she should know that by being married to a kitabi that she is acting against the weight of the consensus; I tell her what the evidence is; and then I tell her my own ijtihad on the matter (that it is makruh for both men and women in non-Muslim countries). After telling her all of this, I add that she must always remember that only God knows best; that she should reflect on the matter as hard as she can; then she should pray and plead for guidance from God; and then ultimately she must do what her conscience dictates.

On Women Leading Prayer

In general, there has been two main orientations regarding the qualifications of an imam at prayer--especially Friday services--the first more liberal than the second. The first orientation practically demands nothing of an imam other than the ability to pray. As long as a man could perform the requisite set of acts and oral recitations required in prayer, the first orientation argued, he was deemed qualified to lead prayer.

The second and more demanding orientation set out what can be called a priority or preference system for an imam. This orientation saw the imam as a sort of teacher to the community--someone who could perform an educational or instructional role during the Friday services. Therefore, the second orientation gave preference to the person who memorized more of the Qur'an compared to others in the community, so that he could recite various portions and expose the community to a wider selection of the Qur'an. The second orientation gave preference to the person who could pronounce and vocalize the words of the Qur'an the best. Importantly, it also gave preference to the person who was the most learned in religion and also the most learned about the affairs of the community. During the khutba this person would be able to educate the community about the meaning of the Qur'an and Sunna and apply the teachings of Islam to the specific issues that are relevant to the community of worshippers. The first orientation practically expected nothing of the khutba--it was deemed sufficient for the imam to remind people of a few religious obligations and exhortations and then move on. The second orientation, relying on the precedent set by the Prophet and al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun, expected the khutba to be an opportunity for inspiring a discourse in the community about the most pressing or pertinent issues confronting the imam's own community. Therefore, it is not enough that the imam be able to recite a few suras from the Qur'an. Rather, the imam should be able to provoke the love of learning in the community, and should set an example as to how the teachings of Islam should and can inform and affect real-life challenges. The way these scholars used to put it is that the imam should play a leading role in creating a community bonded by enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (i.e. bonded by an ethical and moral discourse).

Between the two orientations, I believe, and God knows best, that the second is by far the more correct and the most true to the spirit of jumu'a.

Now, as to the gender issue.

There is no question that the vast majority of jurists excluded women from ever leading men in prayer. Many jurists, however, permitted women to lead women in prayer, if no male is available to lead the prayer. Some jurists said women may lead women even if a male is available to lead as long as women lead only women.

The Qur'an itself does not mandate that only men be allowed to lead prayer. The Sunna is indecisive on the issue. There is evidence that the Prophet on more than one occasion allowed a woman to lead her household in prayer--although the household included men--when the woman was clearly the most learned in the faith.

Up to the fourth Islamic century, there were at least two schools of thought that allowed women to lead men in prayer, if the woman in question was the most learned. In such a case, the men stood to the side so that they were not praying behind the woman imam. However, these schools (al-Thawri and Ibn Jarir) became extinct. So it is fair to say that since the fourth century all schools of thought did not allow women to lead men in prayer.

In my view, I look at the evidence and ask the following question: if a female could better teach and instruct the community about the Islamic faith should she be precluded from doing so because she is a female? Now, there is no dispute that a female could hold a class (halaqa) and instruct women and men about Islam. I think everyone agrees on that point. But the question is: Is there a specific exclusion against women when it comes to prayer? It seems to me that if there is such an exclusion the evidence in favor of this exclusion ought to be strong, if not unequivocally so. But the legal evidence in favor of such an exclusion is not very strong--it is more an issue of customary practice and male-consensus than direct textual evidence. Consequently, in my opinion, priority ought to be given to what is in the best interest of the community, and knowledge is the ultimate good. It seems to me that if a female possesses greater knowledge than a male--if a female is more capable of setting a good example in terms of how she recites the Qur'an and also in terms of teaching the community more about the Islamic faith, a female ought not be precluded from leading jumu'a simply on the grounds of being female.

I do agree with your position that the community of students should learn to depend on themselves. I also agree that if a female leads prayer, the males should not stand directly behind her--she could stand ahead of the lines with the men standing to her side.