MODERN MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE QUR’AN : Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari

Another important chapter is on Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari from post-revolutionary Iran contributed by Farzin Vahdat.  According to him, the "Post-revolutionary Islamic thought in Iran is characterised by a hermeneutic approach. However, the hermeneutics involved in this thought is of a different nature from that of its predecessors, that is, the Islamic revolutionary discourses of the 1960s and 1970s.

 

According to Shabestari faith is [not?] blind imitation. It is a serious act of choice and commitment. Those who blindly imitate cannot be serious about their faith. It is, at best, a mechanical act without passionate commitment. Freedom of choice and freedom of conscience is an important part of living faith. Thus Shabestari writes:

"Faith is an act of choosing, a fateful act. The question is when a human being is facing a dilemma and chooses the type of life style he wants to live by, what path should he take? The ideal society for faith [to flourish] and the faithful is one in which [conditions for making] this choice is most widely available. The truth of faith is a free act of conscious choice. All our mystics ('rafa') have urged the forsaking of imitated faith and adoption of conscious faith."

For Shabestari freedom of thought is absolutely necessary for faith.  For the Mu'tazalites, responsible action is important and this depends on innate human reasoning and this implies freedom of thought. The philosophers emphasise ma’rifah (knowledge) and this isn't possible without going beyond dogmas and liberating thought from it through freedom of thought. Whichever way one looks at it, freedom is necessary and faith (iman) thus has a direct relation with freedom of thought. Faith and responsible action (iman and 'amal salih) are not possible without freedom of thought. 

 

Shabestari also talks of the 'discontent of modernity' and goes on to elaborate it. The centuries before modern centuries were centuries of 'certitude'. People believed in certain dogmas and were certain of them. They never felt it necessary to evaluate them or have a critical attitude towards them. The modern person, on the other hand, lacks such certitude as he/she does not believe in such dogmas. In fact, they have critical evaluation of their beliefs again and again. Thus they suffer from an attitude of uncertainty and lack of permanence, and Shabestari feels modern theologians have to address this problem. While freedom of thought is important, lack of feeling of permanence has also to be addressed.